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1. Summary 
The report provides a brief account of the current state of knowledge of the links between climate 
change and conflict. It then presents relevant literature from Afghanistan (although this is limited), 
and finally examples from other countries or regions where links have been proposed (many of 
which can be considered fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS)). 
A growing number of researchers are linking climate change to violent conflict; however, robust 
scientific evidence of this relationship remains obscure and contested (for example the link 
between drought and the Syrian uprising). Although a direct, linear relationship between climate 
change and conflict is disputed, much of the literature agrees on an indirect link where climate-
related change can influence factors that lead to or exacerbate conflict under certain 
circumstances. Hence, understanding how and under what circumstances these changes may 
lead to violent conflict is key. Much of the literature reviewed emphasises that policy responses 
to climate-related security risks need to acknowledge the complexity of the climate-conflict 
relationship through specific mechanisms, and to be adapted to specific local contexts. Political, 
spatial and temporal dimensions should also be included when studying these links.  
The primary sources used in this review were papers published in peer reviewed scientific 
journals and other grey literature. There are a number of recent detailed synthesis of the climate-
conflict literature which provide more comprehensive reviews of the evidence both for and 
against such a relationship and discuss knowledge gaps (for example see Adger et al., 2014; 
Burke et al., 2015; Dell et al., 2014; Gemenne et al., 2014). There are a number of areas where 
further research is needed. These include the need to analyse the absence of conflict in the face 
of climate risks, the need to expand the range of issues accounted for in analysis of climate and 
security including the impacts of mitigation response on domains of security, and the need to 
include theories of asymmetric power relations in explaining security dimensions (Gemenne et 
al., 2014).  
Literature has been rapidly expanding in this area but geographic coverage is still biased towards 
certain areas (in particular sub-Saharan Africa and East Africa). As found by Nordqvist and 
Krampe (2018) there is not enough known about the climate–conflict relationship in Afghanistan 
(which is critically under researched) and the surrounding South Asia and South East Asia 
regions. In general, there is a lack of rigorous academic studies that focus on the climate-conflict 
relationship for these regions as well as other regions such as Latin America. Three other major 
biases in climate-conflict research have been highlighted in the literature: research primarily 
focuses on a few accessible regions, ignores the regions/countries most affected by climate 
change, and overstates the links between climate change and conflict by focusing on the regions 
that have been conflict-affected (Adams et al., 2018). There is therefore a need for further 
rigorous research. The literature in this review was largely gender-blind, even though gender 
plays a crucial role in both conflict, climate change and peacebuilding. 
Many findings in this report, whilst context-specific, reflect similar insights into mechanisms 
through which climate change may affect violent conflict (although it is important to remember the 
wide-array of other factors that also influence conflict dynamics): 
 Rüttinger et al. (2015) identified seven complex climate-fragility risks that emerge when 
climate change interacts with other social, economic, and environmental pressures: (1) 
Local resource competition; (2) Livelihood insecurity and migration; (3) Extreme weather 
events and disasters; (4) Volatile food prices and provision; (5) Transboundary water 
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management; (6) Sea-level rise and coastal degradation; (7) Unintended effects of 
climate policies. These risks are not isolated and interact with each other in complex 
ways. 
 Lukas and Rüttinger (2016) highlight four major climate-fragility risks for Afghanistan: (1) 
Land degradation and natural resource conflicts; (2) Scarcity and illicit livelihoods; (3) 
Transboundary water conflicts and armed insurgency; (4) Rapid-onset disasters and 
instability. 
 Nordqvist and Krampe (2018) analysed literature on climate-conflict links in South Asia 
and South East Asia, and found that existing research addresses similar categories of 
mechanisms as those presented in previous reviews of other regions (such as the Horn 
of Africa). They found context-specific evidence that climate change can have an effect 
on the causes and dynamics of violent conflict in the region when: (a) it leads to a 
deterioration in people’s livelihoods; (b) it influences the tactical considerations of armed 
groups; (c) elites use it to exploit social vulnerabilities and resources; and (d) it displaces 
people and increases levels of migration. These mechanisms are often interlinked and 
more noticeable in some climatic, conflict and socio-economic contexts.  
 van Baalen and Mobjörk (2018) explore how climate change affects the risk and 
dynamics of violent conflict in East Africa. Conflicts around natural resources – land, 
pasture, water – are particularly frequent where livestock rearing pastoralists are 
involved. They identify four key mechanisms in East Africa: i) deteriorating livelihoods, ii) 
increased migration and changes in pastoralist mobility patterns, iii) tactical 
considerations among armed groups, and iv) elite capture of local disaffection.  
 A recent climate-related security risk assessment of Iraq identified the following priority 
risks (Hassan et al., 2018): (1) Diminished agricultural livelihoods increase local support 
for terrorist groups; (2) Insufficient governance capacity to address and respond to 
climate change and environmental degradation; (3) Increased dependence on water 
flows from riparian neighbours and regional stability; (4) Mass displacement and forced 
migration; (5) Heightened communal tensions over access to food and water.  
2. Links between conflict and climate change 
Current state of knowledge 
In the past decade, there has been a surge of research into whether there is a robust association 
between different aspects of climate change and conflict, with evidence both for (Burke et al., 
2015) and against (Abrahams and Carr, 2017; Adger et al, 2014; Buhaug, 2015) such a 
relationship. Although a growing number of researchers are linking climate change to violent 
conflict, scientific evidence of this relationship remains obscure “due to heterogeneous research 
designs, variables, data sets and scales of analysis” (Adams et al., 2018, p.200). Buhaug (2015, 
p.269) argues that a “decade of systematic research on climate change and armed conflict has 
revealed a number of interesting patterns but few results that are robust across studies”. Other 
authors dispute this. A recent literature review by Sida (2018, p.4) on the relationship between 
climate change and violent conflict summarises the general conclusion that “there is no direct 
and linear relationship…, but under certain circumstances climate-related change can influence 
factors that lead to or exacerbate conflict”.  
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As concluded by Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 
5th Assessment Report (AR5), there is strong evidence that “Human security will be progressively 
threatened as the climate changes” (Adger et al., 2014, p.758). The AR5 further highlights that 
“Human insecurity almost never has single causes, but instead emerges from the interaction of 
multiple factors. […]Climate change is an important factor threatening human security through (1) 
undermining livelihoods […]; (2) compromising culture and identity […]; (3) increasing migration 
that people would rather have avoided […]; and (4) challenging the ability of states to provide the 
conditions necessary for human security” (Adger et al., 2014, p.758). However, evidence on the 
effect of climate change on violent conflict and human security is contested, and there is “little 
agreement about direct causality” (Adger et al., 2014, p.758). explains that “linking structural 
factors embedded in uncertainty, such as climate change, to rare social outcomes, like violent 
conflict, is a highly complicated endeavour” 
The Sida review highlights that there is “no evidence of interstate conflicts where climate change 
is a direct or indirect cause. But climate-related effects will grow in magnitude with consequences 
in space and time that are difficult to predict” (Sida, 2018, p.4). Furthermore, the review 
summarises how the state of knowledge on this relationship has evolved “during the past ten 
years, from depicting simple, deterministic causal chains and catastrophic scenarios to a much 
more nuanced view from the realization that the risk of conflict is highly context dependent, 
where causality is multifactorial and complex” (Sida, 2018, p.6). Studies (such as Van Baalen 
and Mobjörk’s (2018) review of East African studies) show that there may be “indirect linkages 
between climate change and the risk of conflict, where factors that play a role in increasing 
conflict risk may be reinforced by climate change” (Sida, 2018, p.9). It is thus particularly 
important to “understand how and under what circumstances these changes may lead to violent 
conflict. Such a context specific approach may give guidance as to what concrete actions 
contribute to reducing the risk of conflict” (Sida, 2018, p.9). 
Abrahams and Carr (2017, p.233) explore the connections between climate change and conflict 
through a geographic and political ecology literature lens, which they argue:  
“uniquely challenges the dominant ‘threat multiplier‘ framing of climate change’s impact 
on climate, questioning this narrative’s unidirectional flow from climate vulnerability to 
conflict, exploring how climate change can create opportunities for peacebuilding as well 
as conflict, and identifying how climate adaptation activities can themselves become 
catalysts for conflict”. 
Abrahams and Carr (2017, p.236) explain that the “threat multiplier” discourse (i.e. that climate 
change will not cause conflict, but it can exacerbate the risks or worsen the impacts of conflict) 
was “popularised by a 2007 report by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), and has persisted, 
despite CNA more recently reframing climate change as a conflict catalyst that accelerates 
instability”. They highlight that the “threat multiplier” discourse is relatively vague and 
unidirectional, and that the climate-conflict relationship is not merely one where climate change 
drives conflict vulnerability.  
Abrahams and Carr (2017, p.239) highlight the following as some of the few “points of consensus 
in the often-contentious climate-conflict literature”: 
 The relationship between climate change and conflict is not causal; it is widely 
acknowledged that climate change interacts with a host of other issues to produce 
conflict (or build peace).  
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 While the places most likely to be affected by climate change-affected conflict have pre-
existing tensions and are likely to have limited capacity to cope with climatic shifts, 
focusing heavily on places with a reliance on primary production and limited adaptive 
capacity overly-constrains our understanding of conflict outcomes. 
 Conflict increases vulnerability to climate change. 
 Adaptation efforts can trigger conflict. 
Drought and conflict 
In particular, drought has been researched heavily in the climate-conflict literature, and may have 
a more robust link with violence than other climate-related natural disasters, such as flooding. 
For example, a study by Schleussner et al. (2016) based on data on armed-conflict outbreaks 
and climate-related natural disasters for the period 1980–2010, found that the link between 
climate disasters and conflict was particularly strong in ethnically divided countries, and was 
stronger for droughts and heatwaves than for floods.  
von Uexkull et al. (2016, p.12391) presented “an actor-oriented analysis of the drought–conflict 
relationship, focusing specifically on politically relevant ethnic groups and their sensitivity to 
growing-season drought under various political and socioeconomic contexts”, looking at conflict 
event data that covers Asia and Africa between 1989–2014. Their analysis reveals that the 
impact of drought on conflict under most circumstances is limited: “However, for agriculturally 
dependent groups as well as politically excluded groups in very poor countries, a local drought is 
found to increase the likelihood of sustained violence” (von Uexkull et al., 2016, p.12391). They 
interpret this as evidence of the reciprocal relationship between drought and conflict, whereby 
each phenomenon makes a group more vulnerable to the other. They conclude that their results 
emphasise “the importance of strengthening adaptive capacities of agriculturally dependent 
communities, in particular in areas already affected by conflict” (von Uexkull et al., 2016, 
p.12395). 
Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) explored the relationship between drought and civil war, and 
found that the link between rainfall, temperature and civil war found in previous literature may be 
driven by aggregate shocks (such as global climate) that were not accounted for. A standard 
differences-in-differences specification relying only on within country variation reveals a much 
weaker and insignificant link between weather variables and civil war. They used the Palmer 
drought severity index (a meteorological measurement of drought) to explore this link on a local 
level. However, they found that evidence for a positive link between drought and civil war was 
weak. They conclude that richer data are needed to obtain firm conclusions regarding the 
climate–conflict relationship (Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014, p.213). 
Mechanisms for conflict under climate change 
Rüttinger et al. (2015), in an independent report commissioned by the G7 members on climate 
change and fragility risks, identified seven compound climate-fragility risks that emerge when 
climate change interacts with other social, economic, and environmental pressures -which they 
say “pose serious threats to the stability of states and societies in the decades ahead” (Rüttinger 
et al., 2015, p.vii). They further emphasise that these seven climate-fragility risks are not isolated 
from each other but interact in complex ways. The seven climate-fragility risks identified are 
(Rüttinger et al., 2015, pp.viii-x):  
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1. Local resource competition: As the pressure on natural resources increases, competition 
can lead to instability and even violent conflict in the absence of effective dispute 
resolution. 
2. Livelihood insecurity and migration: Climate changes will increase the human insecurity 
of people who depend on natural resources for their livelihoods, which could push them 
to migrate or turn to illegal sources of income. 
3. Extreme weather events and disasters: Extreme weather events and disasters will 
exacerbate fragility challenges and can increase people’s vulnerability and grievances, 
especially in conflict-affected situations. 
4. Volatile food prices and provision: Climate change is highly likely to disrupt food 
production in many regions, increasing prices and market volatility, and heightening the 
risk of protests, rioting, and civil conflict. 
5. Transboundary water management: Transboundary waters are frequently a source of 
tension; as demand grows and climate impacts affect availability and quality, competition 
over water use will likely increase the pressure on existing governance structures. 
6. Sea-level rise and coastal degradation: Rising sea levels will threaten the viability of low-
lying areas even before they are submerged, leading to social disruption, displacement, 
and migration, while disagreements over maritime boundaries and ocean resources may 
increase. 
7. Unintended effects of climate policies: As climate adaptation and mitigation policies are 
more broadly implemented, the risks of unintended negative effects — particularly in 
fragile contexts — will also increase. 
However, Abrahams and Carr (2017, pp.237-238) underscore that “Nearly all of these 
compounding factors assume reliance on primary production or limited adaptive capacity”, and 
“ignore larger issues of political economy when explaining the rise (or lack of a rise) of conflict in 
particular places”. 
Most climate–conflict research has focused on East Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and the links 
remain understudied in South Asia and South East Asia (see Adams et al., 2018). Nordqvist and 
Krampe (2018, p.1) recently undertook a systematic literature review of climate–conflict research 
in South Asia and South East Asia and highlight that “Although these regions have been greatly 
affected by both climate change and conflict, there have only been a small number of rigorous 
academic studies that focus on the climate–conflict relationship”.  
Nordqvist and Krampe’s analysis finds that existing research addresses similar categories of 
mechanisms linking climate change to the risk of violent conflict as those presented in previous 
reviews of other regions. Nonetheless, there were also noticeable differences between the way 
these mechanisms play out in the two regions of Asia and in other regions of the world (such as 
the Horn of Africa), which is to be expected given their different climatic, conflict and socio-
economic contexts. For example, conflicts between herders and farmers, which are a key aspect 
of the links between climate and conflict in East Africa, are not a relevant feature in South Asia 
and South East Asia (Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018, p.2). The review also “reveals interesting 
nuances in the types of violence linked to climate change; that is, the type of violence appears to 
depend on the social and political context, rather than any observable climate-related 
environmental change” (Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018, p.5). The review highlights that although 
the scarce evidence base “constrains the ability to draw general conclusions, there is context-
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specific evidence that climate change can have an effect on the causes and dynamics of violent 
conflict in the region when” (Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018, p.1):  
a) it leads to a deterioration in people’s livelihoods;  
b) it influences the tactical considerations of armed groups in ongoing conflicts; 
c) elites use it to exploit social vulnerabilities and resources; and  
d) it displaces people and increases levels of migration in vulnerable and highly vulnerable 
natural resources dependent contexts.  
The review also acknowledges that the aforementioned mechanisms are often interlinked and 
more noticeable in some climatic, conflict and socio-economic contexts than in others; it also 
agrees with other research that the climate–conflict linkage primarily plays out in contexts that 
are already vulnerable to climate change, and where income is highly dependent on agriculture 
and fishing (Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018, p.9). Hence, there is a need for more research in 
South Asia and South East Asia; in particular, there is a lack of rigorous evidence from 
Afghanistan, Myanmar and Pakistan, which are experiencing both climate change and violent 
conflicts. Also, research into comparators of regions that are highly vulnerable to climate change 
but are able to peacefully mitigate such stressors (Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018, p.9).    
Vulnerability and fragile states 
In the review of climate-conflict relationship by Sida (2018) it was found that fragile states and 
communities with a history of conflict are the most vulnerable to worsened conflict, due to further 
climate-related stress. Lukas and Rüttinger (2016, p.III) in their German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs-funded analyses of the links between climate change and Non-State Armed Groups, also 
emphasise the complexity of the relationship between climate change, conflict and fragility, and 
that fragile states are particularly vulnerable: 
“The increasing impacts of climate change do not automatically lead to more fragility and 
conflict. Rather, climate change acts as a threat multiplier. It interacts and converges with 
other existing risks and pressures in a given context and can increase the likelihood of 
fragility or violent conflict. States experiencing fragility or conflict are particularly affected, 
but also seemingly stable states can be overburdened by the combined pressures of 
climate change, population growth, urbanization, environmental degradation and rising 
socio-economic inequalities”.  
Stites and Bushby (2017, p.8) also highlight this connection, adding that “many countries 
categorised as conflict-affected or fragile states are particularly at risk to the impacts of climate 
change ([e.g.] Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and Somalia[..]), with their most vulnerable 
populations at heightened risk”. This is because many poor and marginalised populations in rural 
areas often rely heavily on natural resources to sustain their livelihoods, which may be negatively 
impacted by climate change leading to out-migration and competition within these groups (Stites 
and Bushby, 2017, p.8). 
Vivekananda et al. (2014) aimed at better understanding resilience to climate and environmental 
changes in fragile and conflict-affected societies through a conceptual framework exploring the 
climate-fragility-conflict and climate-resilience-peace nexus (see Figure 1). They set out a 
framework which “stresses the need to understand the linked conceptual pairs of fragility and 
stability, vulnerability and resilience, and human security and insecurity, in order to analyse the 
pathways between climate change and violent conflict or peace” (Vivekananda et al., 2014, 
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p.497). They conclude, “The double dividend of resilience to conflict and climate change can only 
be achieved if the contextual complexities are taken into account. For the climate change 
community this means to ensure their adaptation efforts are peace-positive, and for the 
peacebuilding and development communities it means to ensure their conflict mitigation and 
development efforts are climate-proof” (Vivekananda et al., 2014, p.497). 
Figure 1. Integrated framework of the climate change-conflict/peace nexus 
Source: Adapted from Vivekananda et al. (2014, pp.493)  
Biases in climate-conflict studies 
A number of studies have recently highlighted the tendency for climate-conflict research to be 
concentrated in certain regions, leading to significant biases (see Adams et al., 2018). Hendrix 
(2018, p.190) highlights that this “may limit understanding of the socioeconomic and political 
conditions in which such conflict occurs, and how these conflicts could be prevented”. 
Adams et al. (2018) explored whether the research claiming a link between climate change and 
violent conflict is based on a biased sampling strategy through a systematic review of the 
relevant academic literature for the period 1990–2017. They highlight three major biases in 
climate-conflict research (Adams et al., 2018, also reflected in Hendrix, 2018): 
 Scholars have “gone looking for climate–conflict links in countries and regions that have 
been conflict-affected, rather than those most affected by climate change”, ignoring 
locations where environmental shocks were not followed by armed conflict. For example, 
“the drought that affected Syria also affected neighbouring Jordan, Lebanon and Cyprus, 
yet widespread violence did not occur there” (Hendrix, 2018, p.190). 
 Scholars have “not focused more attention on those countries most likely to be affected 
by[/vulnerable to] climate change”. For example, “comparatively climate-change exposed 
countries such as Bangladesh and Haiti have received very scant attention from 
researchers investigating climate–conflict impacts” (Hendrix et al., 2018, p.190). 
 Scholars have “been focusing effort on cases where it is more convenient to conduct 
research” (Hendrix, 2018, p.190). For example, “Kenya, which ties as the single most-
often-mentioned country in the climate–conflict literature, is neither particularly conflict-
prone nor climate vulnerable” (Hendrix, 2018, p.191). 
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Adams et al. (2018, p.200) conclude that “These biases mean that research on climate change 
and conflict primarily focuses on a few accessible regions, overstates the links between both 
phenomena and cannot explain peaceful outcomes from climate change”. Hendrix (2018, p.191) 
argues that these findings have important implications (and limitations) for the understanding of 
“the socioeconomic and political conditions in which climate-related conflict is likely to emerge 
and for informing policy interventions designed to mitigate climate–conflict risk”. 
Gemenne et al. (2014) in their review of the robustness of present social sciences analysis in 
assessing the causes and consequences of climate change on human security, agree that the 
climate-security nexus is more complex than it appears and identify a number of areas where 
further research is needed. These include the need to analyse the absence of conflict in the face 
of climate risks, the need to expand the range of issues accounted for in analysis of climate and 
security including the impacts of mitigation response on domains of security, and the need to 
include theories of asymmetric power relations in explaining security dimensions (Gemenne et 
al., 2014, p.1).  
3. Climate-conflict links in Afghanistan 
As discussed above, climate-related conflict is highly context-specific. This review found that 
there is a major lack of robust studies and research into climate-conflict links in Afghanistan, 
despite its vulnerability to both climate change and conflict, reflecting the findings of Nordqvist 
and Krampe (2018).  
Afghanistan is among the most vulnerable countries to the adverse impacts of climate change 
particularly in relation to drought and flooding (Thomas, 2016, p.i; see also Lukas and Rüttinger, 
2016, pp.28-30 for a detailed contextual analysis of Afghanistan, including information on socio-
economic and political issues, conflict history and actors, illicit opium trade). This is in some part 
due to its level of exposure, but is also the consequence of very high sensitivity of its population 
to the stimulus of climate shocks (as calculated through socio-economic, cultural and political 
factors). Temperature is projected to increase more than the global average, with warming 
expected to reach between 1.7-2.3oC by 2050 depending on the emissions scenario used. 
Precipitation projections are much more uncertain but changes in the timing and volume of 
precipitation are expected and spring rainfall is expected to decrease over most of the country 
(NEPA, UNEP and WFP, 2016, pp.52-53). In general, droughts will become a norm by 2030 and 
flood events will be more intense. A study by NEPA, UNEP and WFP (2016, p.4) looked at the 
impact of climate change on livelihoods and food security in Afghanistan, focused on four climate 
hazards that “pose the largest risk to livelihoods in Afghanistan”. These were: drought caused by 
reduced spring rain-fall, drought caused by declining river flows due to reduced spring-time 
snowmelt in the highlands, floods caused by increased heavy spring rainfall, and riverine floods 
caused by heavier and faster upstream snowmelt in the highlands. They predicted that future 
climate change would impact on these four areas. Women are among the most severely affected 
in Afghanistan as they are reliant on natural resources sensitive to changes in climate for their 
daily tasks, such as household water supply or collecting wood for cooking (Thomas, 2016, p.i).  
Lukas and Rüttinger (2016) analysed the links between climate change and Non-State Armed 
Groups using four case studies that span the whole spectrum of Non-State Armed Groups and 
patterns of violence, conflict and fragility: Afghanistan, Guatemala, Lake Chad and Syria. Their 
Afghanistan case study emphasises the widely underreported and understudied issue of natural 
resources and their role in the conflicts, with competition over scarce resources partly driven by 
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trying to gain political power through their control. Profit seeking interacts with other conflict 
drivers such as unresolved grievances, patronage, corruption, and a legacy of violence.  
The authors stress that in Afghanistan:  
“availability of water per capita is projected to decline by 50 percent by 2040. Rising 
temperatures, increasing evapotranspiration and lower levels of rainfall, and weak 
infrastructure and water management systems will threaten the livelihoods of millions of rural 
Afghans, making them more vulnerable to illicit livelihoods and recruitment by armed groups. 
…As climate change worsens conditions for rural farmers, support for [Non-State Armed 
Groups] is likely to increase as they enable farmers to access markets, provide capital for 
investment and thereby support economic development” (Lukas and Rüttinger, 2016, p.34).  
Lukas and Rüttinger (2016, pp.31-34) highlight four major climate-fragility risks for Afghanistan in 
their literature review: 
1) Land degradation and natural resource conflicts: Degradation and rapid population 
growth are increasing competition for land, which in turn feeds into long-standing ethnic 
conflicts between nomadic Pashtun pastoralists (Kuchi) and sedentary Hazara for access 
to pastures (Brown and Blankenship 2013 cited in Lukas and Rüttinger, 2016). According 
to experts, the conflict between the two groups is also driven by the Taliban, who provide 
arms to the Kuchi and use the conflict to win land from the foreign occupants and the 
national military and to secure trading routes for contraband goods.  
2) Scarcity and illicit livelihoods: In Afghanistan, the agricultural sector contributes up to 
28 percent of GDP, employs roughly 60 percent and underpins the livelihoods of 85 
percent of the population (World Bank 2016a cited in Lukas and Rüttinger, 2016). 
However, only 12 percent of the total land is arable, and agriculture is mostly rain-fed, 
leaving it highly dependent on and vulnerable to erratic rainfall and winter snows in the 
Hindu Kush mountains. Water resources are not equitably distributed across 
Afghanistan. Water scarcity and livelihood insecurity drive farmers to engage in illicit 
poppy production instead of or in addition to alternative, more water-intensive crops such 
as wheat or almonds. Conflict and insecurity are also adversely affecting agricultural 
output. Reduced livelihood opportunities from drought can also make young people more 
vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups: during Afghanistan’s 2006/07 drought, many 
young men in Balkh province opted to join the Taliban or other insurgent groups to 
diversify their livelihoods (Heijmans et al. 2009 cited in Lukas and Rüttinger, 2016).  
3) Transboundary water conflicts and armed insurgency: Afghanistan is an upstream 
riparian country with four major rivers that are mainly fed by mountain streams. Regional 
cooperation is lacking and control of water sources has been used as an instrument of 
political provocation in the past. Climate change-related recurrent droughts and reduced 
river flow from earlier snow melt will likely increase pressure on scarce water resources. 
[Non-State Armed Groups], particularly the Taliban, are increasingly making use of the 
deep-seated regional tensions for their own strategic interests. According to a report 
published by the Environmental Law Institute and UNEP in 2014 (cited in Lukas and 
Rüttinger, 2016), Iran has adopted a paradoxical strategy of cooperation and 
destabilization in Afghanistan. On the one hand, it supports the development of efficient 
water use and transport systems and, on the other, it backs Taliban insurgent groups and 
direct actions against water diversions.  
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4) Rapid-onset disasters and instability: Afghanistan is exposed to a variety of natural 
hazards. It was ranked 24th in the Global Climate Risk Index of countries most affected 
by extreme weather events over the past 20 years (1997-2016) (Eckstein et al., 2017, 
p.32). As glacier melt in Afghanistan’s Hindu Kush mountains accelerates with climate 
change, rapid-onset disasters like flash floods, flooding and landslides are expected to 
increase (Kaltenborn et al. 2010 cited in Lukas and Rüttinger, 2016). Disaster 
preparedness is extremely low, as the country lacks effective early warning systems, and 
community resilience has been eroded by decades of conflict. As poverty and 
unemployment are among the mayor drivers of conflict in Afghanistan, inadequate and 
unequal disaster management can create a fertile ground for popular discontent or even 
violence (Government of Afghanistan 2011 cited in Lukas and Rüttinger, 2016). 
Iqbal et al. (2018, p.1741) explored farmers’ perceptions of drought prevalence, its socio-
economic impacts, their coping strategies, and types of conflicts and resolution mechanisms to it 
in Herat Province, Afghanistan. This was done using a questionnaire, which was completed by 
147 farming households in August 2015. Their results showed that drought has had serious 
economic impacts, including loss of employment and reduction in crop yield and livestock 
production, which have reduced farmers’ livelihood options and weakened their financial 
situation. Some of the social impacts have included migration, a sense of hopelessness and loss, 
conflicts over water, health problems, and limits to food options. The authors also highlighted that 
“Farmers used local techniques to adapt to drought and lessen its effects. Farmers perceived 
irrigation water to be a major source of conflict. Local elders, water-user associations, and formal 
courts were reported to be the most successful conflict resolution methods” (Iqbal et al., 2018, 
p.1741). The majority of the respondents said that the conflicts arise when some users fail to 
comply with the rotating water allocation and try to divert water illegally; approximately 26 percent 
of the respondents indicated that conflicts arise because of water scarcity, which intensifies 
during drought years (Iqbal et al., 2018, p.1753).  
In a working paper for the Swedish Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) developed from his 
Masters thesis, Bounadi (2018) constructed a new panel dataset on weather (precipitation and 
temperature) and conflicts across Afghanistan between July 2005 and December 2016. He finds 
that “exchanging colder for warmer days tends to increase the likelihood of conflict and that 
precipitation does not drive the occurrence of conflict” (Bounadi, 2018, p.5). Although he 
recognises that this is not always the case. 
As part of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) publications, Huot and Pain 
(2017, p.6) report on the third wave of a longitudinal panel study tracing the livelihood trajectories 
of rural households in Afghanistan over a 14-year period in Sar-i-Pul province (one of three study 
sites). They report that cyclical drought periods in the province have led to a diversification of 
activities by households, including growing opium poppies. They also highlight that there is an 
assumption by the international community and Afghanistan government that agriculture is the 
main source of livelihoods for a majority of its population. The study concludes that there is:  
“incoherence between the rhetoric of agricultural policy [in Afghanistan] and evidence on the 
ground…, rural households engage in a number of coping strategies to deal with both 
idiosyncratic shocks such as illnesses and marriage costs, as well as larger environmental 
crises, like droughts and floods. What is clear is that these coping strategies, while varied, 
are largely non-farm based; in almost no cases are households in a position to survive, let 
alone improve their circumstances, through agricultural pursuits alone…Thus, most 
households seek livelihood security from activities beyond the village, and therefore outside 
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the rural economy, instead depending largely on remittance income and employment in 
urban sectors” (Huot and Pain, 2017, p.35).  
4. Other FCAS case studies1 
The following case studies offer examples from the literature of other regions and countries 
where a connection between climate change and conflict has attempted to be made. These vary 
in robustness and scale, and many of the conclusions drawn are contested. The findings are also 
very context specific. The above debate on the strength of the connections between climate 
change and conflict should also be kept in mind. 
East Africa and violent conflict 
van Baalen and Mobjörk (2018) explore how climate change affects the risk and dynamics of 
violent conflict. They emphasise that although there has been much research into climate-conflict 
risks and dynamics, less is known about the exact mechanisms through which climate change 
affects violent conflict. They undertook a systematic review of 43 peer-reviewed quantitative and 
qualitative articles published 1989–2016 on the relationship between climate-related change and 
local, violent conflicts in East Africa (van Baalen and Mobjörk, 2018, p.563). They show that 
conflicts around natural resources – land, pasture, water – are particularly frequent where 
livestock rearing pastoralists are involved. They identify four key mechanisms through their 
comprehensive analysis, which broadly reflect the four mechanisms identified by Nordqvist and 
Krampe (2018) in their review of climate-conflict studies for South Asia and South East Asia (see 
section 2). The four mechanisms identified by van Baalen and Mobjörk (2018, p.551) for how 
climate-related changes may lead to violent conflict in East Africa: i) deteriorating livelihoods, ii) 
increased migration and changes in pastoralist mobility patterns, iii) tactical considerations 
among armed groups, and iv) elite capture of local disaffection. They explain that “these 
explanations are often complimentary, intrinsically interlinked, and applicable to different stages 
of the chain from climate-related environmental change to violent conflict” (van Baalen and 
Mobjörk, 2018, p.551). These explanations for climate-conflict in East Africa also rely on different 
mechanisms, emphasise different actors, and focus on different types of outcomes, and so they 
also yield different expectations about when and where violence is most likely to occur (van 
Baalen and Mobjörk, 2018). There are also different political dynamics at play that condition or 
mediate the relationship. Van Baalen and Mobjörk (2018, p.564) emphasise the need for 
scholars to consider political, spatial and temporal dimensions when studying the links between 
environmental change and violent conflict, and recommend for these factors to be systematically 
included in calculations.  
Drought, migration and violence in Kenya 
Linke et al. (2018, p.1) used original national survey data from Kenya to investigate whether 
people who report relocating due to drought are more likely to be victims of violence than people 
who do not move. They also examine whether this migrant sample supports the use of violence 
at higher levels than the general population, conditional on their experiences. Controlling for 
many individual-level and contextual variables, they find that “those who have relocated are 
                                                   
1 Another K4D helpdesk reviewed the evidence on climate change and stability in North Africa; see Price (2017) 
for further information and studies.  
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consistently more likely to be victims of violence than those who have not, and that those who 
relocated temporarily support the use of violence at higher levels than the general population if, 
and only if, they are themselves victims of violence. Vulnerable migrant populations may be 
subject to violence as observational aggregate studies suggest, but they are not likely to be the 
sources of violence unless victimized first“ (Linke et al., 2018, p.1). The authors recognise some 
limitations in their survey design and the influence of pastoral livelihoods in the sample.  
Livestock and drought in Somalia 
Maystadt and Ecker (2014, p.1157) explored a causal relationship between droughts and local 
violent conflict in Somalia, in a within-country setting over a short time frame. They estimated that 
a one standard deviation increase in drought intensity and length raised the likelihood of conflict 
by 62 percent. Furthermore, they found that “local livestock markets were the primary channel 
through which droughts fuel conflict in Somalia, and that livestock price downturns and hence 
losses in herders’ income lower one’s resistance to engage in conflict activities” (Maystadt and 
Ecker, 2014, p.1177). 
Hot-spot mapping in South and South East Asia 
Busby et al. (2018, p.88) recently attempted to hot-spot or map sub-national “climate security 
vulnerability” in 11 countries in South and Southeast Asia. They define climate security 
vulnerability as “areas where large numbers of people are at risk of death due to exposure to 
climate-related hazards and the follow-on consequences of exposure, including but not limited to 
conflict”. The study used the Asian Climate Security Vulnerability Model Version 1 (ACSV V1) 
and found that “Bangladesh, parts of southern and western Myanmar (the Ayeyarwady region 
and Rakhine state), and parts of southern and northwest Pakistan (Sindh and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa provinces) were the most vulnerable from a climate security perspective” (Busby et 
al., 2018, p.88). The authors acknowledge the potential weaknesses and limitations of their 
model and the need for further iterations. However, they argue that their maps provide some 
insight of “underlying realities and are useful as a point of departure for deliberation and 
additional study”, which are meant to “serve as preliminary focal points for discussion and 
research with country and regional experts” (Busby et al., 2018, p.102).  
Flooding in Pakistan  
A case study of flood mismanagement and fragility in Pakistan by Schilling et al. (2013) and 
summarised by Rüttinger et al. (2015, p.40), demonstrates how unprecedented flooding in 2010 
and 2011 in the Sindh province resulting from extreme rainfall, exposed the region’s poorly 
planned drainage and irrigation projects. This then exacerbated the human cost and 
environmental damages of the disaster. Rüttinger et al. (2015, p.40) argue that the “inadequacy 
of state responses in Sindh deepened existing grievances related to the marginalization of flood-
affected communities and contributed to social unrest, small-scale protests, and demonstrations 
(Schilling et al. 2013)”. Schilling et al. (2013) identified several ways in which environmental 
change contributes to existing conflicts in Pakistan, broadly classified into conflicts over land and 
over fish resources. They elaborated that “according to several farmers and other community 
members, the higher rainfall variability and frequency of floods as well as prolonged droughts 
have contributed to a decrease in vegetation cover and pasture… During the summer, people 
from the water deficient Thar area mostly come to Badin to graze their animals. … Because of 
limited vegetation cover, the natives of Badin no longer allow Thari livestock to graze on their 
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land. According to community respondents from Badin, these conflicts are affecting their income 
and weakening the status of the local communities” (Schilling et al., 2013, p.38). 
Drought and the Syrian conflict 
An example of a possible climate-conflict relationship that has received much attention is the 
contribution of a severe 3-year drought beginning in 2006/2007 as a major factor in the Syrian 
uprising in 2011. This is a controversial hypotheses, with literature both for (Kelley et al., 2015) 
and against (de Châtel, 2014) such a relationship. Kelley et al. (2015, P.1) argue, “For Syria, a 
country marked by poor governance and unsustainable agricultural and environmental policies, 
the drought had a catalytic effect, contributing to political unrest” and that this drought was linked 
with long-term climate change. They acknowledge the importance of other factors, and that their 
“analysis of the conflict in Syria shows an impact of an extreme climate event in the context of 
government failure, exacerbated by the singular circumstance of the large influx of Iraqi 
refugees” (Kelley et al., 2015, P.5).  
However, this hypothesis is questioned as being simplistic and misleading by others. De Châtel 
(2014, p.532) argues instead that “The Syrian uprising that started in March 2011 was sparked 
by a series of inter-related social, economic and political factors”, including decades of resource 
mismanagement, dysfunctional agricultural policies and a sudden removal of fuel subsidies and 
simultaneous dramatic increases in global food prices, under a repressive regime. She argues 
that although the drought may have exacerbated existing conditions, focusing on external factors 
like drought and climate change in the context of the Syrian uprising is counterproductive as it 
diverts attention from more fundamental political and economic motives behind the protests and 
shifts responsibility away from the Syrian government (De Châtel, 2014, p.532). 
Iraq climate-related security risk assessment 
A recent climate-related security risk assessment of Iraq undertaken by the Expert Working 
Group on Climate-related Security Risks emphasised that “[t]he combination of [Iraq’s] 
hydrological limitations, increasing temperatures and extreme weather events puts pressure on 
basic resources and undermines livelihood security for Iraq’s population” (Hassan et al., 2018, 
p.1). The report identified the following five priority climate-related security risks in Iraq amid this 
complex region (Hassan et al., 2018, pp.1-2):  
1. Diminished agricultural livelihoods from increasing water scarcity increase local support 
for terrorist groups. 
2. Insufficient governance capacity to address and respond to climate change and 
environmental degradation. 
3. Increased dependence on water flows from riparian neighbours and regional stability as 
rainfall becomes more erratic in the region. 
4. Mass displacement and forced migration due to the combination of increased rainfall 
variability and dam projects in neighbouring countries.  
5. Heightened communal tensions over access to food and water due to erratic precipitation 
and increased temperatures from climate change leading to an intensified risk of more 
regular and prolonged periods of drought.   
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